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ABSTRACT
Substantial economies of scale in the production of information goods give reasons for considering the
outsourcing of the production. The trade in information goods – resulting from the outsourcing of the
production – is a typical transaction which can be analysed using transaction cost theory. Taking into
account the particular characteristics of information goods and the process of delivering them
through digital networks, three out of five sources of transaction costs can be identified which are
most relevant for the outsourcing decision. In designing the transaction process, these sources
(bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty) can be influenced by the transaction partners in
order to reduce market-based transaction costs. Employing an intermediary can further reduce
transaction costs resulting from bounded rationality and uncertainty but can (overall) also give rise to
opportunism. We find that opportunism is the most relevant source of transaction costs if an
intermediary is employed on the market for information goods.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Content Syndication describes a familiar way of generating income in the media industry. According
to this concept, content is created once and then multiply sold to different customers for commercial
re-use [Anding/Hess, 2001: 4]. Examples include newspaper comic strips, columns and common TVserials. Recently, the concept became increasingly popular in the online media sector, which is using
the fast internet infrastructure to publish already created digital content on different websites, in
intranets or newsletters. After a first enthusiasm and naïve approaches of media companies and startups to utilise the new business model, a thorough economic analysis is needed in order to assess the
viability and potential of online content syndication. Explanatory approaches can be found in
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organisational theories, of which the transaction cost theory is one of the most important and fruitful.
Transaction cost theory has already been applied widely for organisational problems on the basis of
the changed role of information as a production factor [Choo, 1991]. In the paper on hand we examine
the role of transaction costs for organisational problems when information becomes the product itself.
Further, the paper outlines possible courses of action which the participants in online content
syndication should follow in order to minimise transaction costs. In chapter 2, we introduce online
content syndication and transaction cost theory and specify particularities of transaction costs
occurring in content syndication. In chapter 3 we analyse transaction cost sources in bilateral content
exchange between originator and publisher and reveal transaction cost sources with most significance.
Chapter 4 describes how intermediary institutions affect these most significant transaction cost
sources. Concluding remarks are given in chapter 5. Altogether, the paper provides a theoretical
analysis of the subject and does not take into account empirical research. However, the analysis on
hand complies with empirical findings of failed and successful content syndication business models
(like the case of iSyndicate, Inc.).

2.

BACKGROUND

2.1.

Online Content Syndication

The term content is used quite vaguely in theory and practise while an elaborate economic definition is
still missing. The word is often used overlapping with or in connection with the term “information
good”, implying that content can be sold as a good on a market. In theory, definitions rank from
“information essentially is everything that can be digitised” [Shapiro/Varian, 1998], to (information
goods are) “the smallest logical unit of information that does not exhibit technological
complementarities, such as a news story, a photograph or a song” [Bakos/Brynjolfsson, 1996] and
“content is usually taken to mean professionally prepared material such as books, movies, sports
events, or music” [Odlyzko, 2001]. Practitioners often speak of content as “everything that is
presented on a website”. The media industry uses the term more pragmatically to address “information
offered as a product on the market” [Hess, 2001]. Most of these definitions omit the technical
perspective of content being information which is independent from any transport media. No
definition takes into account that content is always connected with copyrights (as a form of property
rights). Approaching an economically sensible definition, we consider content as “an abstract term for
information and its copyrights, existing independently from transport media, that is – economically or
in any other way – valuable for an audience and offered on a market” [Anding/Hess, 2001: 3].
Content can easily be stored digitally in order to be delivered through digital networks.
The term syndication describes the “sale of the same good to many customers” [Werbach, 2000: 86]
and has commonly been used in the media industry for long. First established in the early 20’s in the
USA when syndication named the repeated distribution of movies in cinemas in order to
commercialise it over again, the term has recently been applied to the re-sale of already produced (and
published) content to different publishers in any traditional media (TV, radio, print, etc.) [Sedge,
2000]. Currently, with the emerging internet and the widespread use of digital content on websites, on
intranets, in newsletters, etc., syndication is used in an inflationary way to describe the commercial
exchange of content between originators and different publishers on the internet. We term this recent
development online content syndication, characterising the transition of the traditional syndication
concept to the online media sector. Using the internet as an infrastructure for content syndication does
not only effect the speed of the content delivery but also the syndication concept as a whole. We no
longer speak of syndication only as a re-use of content at different times, but also by different
publishers at the same time.
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We should add by way of explanation that online content syndication can either take place directly
between originators and publishers (1) or by employing an intermediary (Content Syndicator) (2).
Figure 1 visualises this distinction.
Content
Intermediary

2
Content
Originator

1

Content
Publisher

Figure 1: Different organisational arrangements for online content syndication

Online content syndication predominantly involves the recurring delivery of information products
according to a pre-defined scheme. Examples are given by comic strips published daily or weekly in
different newspapers. However, depending on the specificities of the exchanged information product,
also nonrecurring delivery is possible.
2.2.

Transaction Cost Theory

Transaction cost theory is embedded in the framework of the new institutional economics, comprising
three other theoretical approaches, which are property rights theory, contract theory and principal
agent theory [Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 46; Krause, 1996]. Transaction cost theory can
generally be applied for problems which can be represented as contract-problems [Picot/Dietl, 1990:
182; Rüdiger, 1998: 34], where two or more parties are involved. The most important application is
the decision problem of make-or-buy, i.e. the decision between hierarchical integration and marketbased organisation of the production [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 182] – as an explanation for the existence of
firms. Further, transaction cost theory is applied for decisions on the organisation of markets, namely
the employment of intermediaries within the process of market transactions [Sarkar/Butler/Steinfield,
1995] as well as for the design of inter-organisational co-operations. A transaction is defined as the
transfer of property rights [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 178; Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 50], whereas
property rights are the rights of individuals to the use, alteration, income and transfer of resources [De
Alessi, 1990: 8; Picot/Dietl/Franck, 1999: 55].
Transaction cost theory was introduced by COASE [1937], who analysed why firms exist, what
determines the number of firms and what firms do. He found, that the theoretical interest in this subject
was surprisingly rather small up to this time. COASE spoke indirectly of the cost of using the market
mechanism for exchanging goods and services, without explicitly using the term transaction cost.
Later, WILLIAMSON developed an elaborate framework of transaction cost theory, based on two
assumptions of human behaviour (bounded rationality and opportunism) and three key dimensions of
transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) as the basic sources of transaction costs
[Williamson, 1975].
Bounded rationality results from human (i.e. decision maker’s) limits on cognitive capabilities and
imperfect information [Simon, 1957; Selten, 1998]. Simon defines economic actors as “intendedly
rational but only limitedly so” [Simon, 1961: xxiv]. Thus, humans are inclined to make erroneous
decisions. Opportunism describes the human self-interest in taking actions, including cheating, lying
and infringing contracts [Williamson, 1993: 458]. Asset specificity terms the significance of certain
assets that support a specific transaction. These are assets which cannot be transferred to or used
within other transactions [Williamson, 1981: 555]. WILLIAMSON mentions four types of asset
specificity: site- , physical assets- and human asset specificity as well as dedicated assets. Uncertainty
is embodied in any kind of future action and frequency describes how often a specific transaction takes
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place. The magnitude of these five parameters determines the scale of transaction costs occurring.
Typically, the frequency of a transaction lowers transaction costs due to economies of scale, while all
other four parameters have an increasing effect – whereby asset specificity carries most influence
[Williamson, 1981: 555]. Figure 2 shows a synopsis of the transaction cost sources mentioned above
and assigns these sources to transaction partners and the transaction itself.
• bounded
rationality
• opportunism

• asset
specificity
• uncertainty
• frequency

Transaction
Partner
A

• bounded
rationality
• opportunism

Transaction
Partner
B

Figure 2: Sources of transaction costs

According to the process of executing a transaction, different components of transaction costs can be
identified. COASE distinguishes between costs of „discovering what the relevant prices are” and the
“costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction” [Coase, 1937:
21]. PICOT/REICHWALD/WIGAND perceive in more detail costs of initiation, agreement, execution,
monitoring and adjustment [Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 50].
Transaction costs vary among different organisational arrangements and can be distinguished into
internal (within a firm) or external (on the market) transaction costs. According to COASE, this fact
determines the existence of firms – in cases where external transaction costs on the market exceed
internal costs within the firm. “Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production” [Coase, 1937: 19]. In fact, not only the transaction costs but also
the production costs vary among different organisational arrangements. Thus, the sum of productionand transaction cost is the criterion for which organisational arrangement, either market or hierarchy,
is efficient. Transaction cost theory regularly assumes production costs being equal for both
organisational arrangements.
2.3.

Content Syndication and Transaction Costs

Transaction cost theory was introduced independently from the actual product as the subject of the
transaction. However, a transaction can be realised the more efficient the better the characteristics of
the organisational arrangement match the requirements which result from the characteristics of the
transaction and the transaction partners [Rüdiger, 1998: 33]. In the scope of this paper we will discuss
characteristics of information goods and the content syndication process in order to assess the sources
of transaction costs and the efficiency of different organisational arrangements for the content
production and -distribution. Therefore we will shortly explain the components of transaction costs
occurring in content syndication and in section 3 and 4 of the paper we will focus on the sources of
transaction costs (according to figure 2) in the field of content syndication.
transaction cost
component
initiation
agreement
execution
monitoring

occurrence in content syndication
-

search for content seller or buyer
assessment of product samples
negotiation and contract design with focus on usage- and copyrights
one-time or recurring delivery of content
transfer of property rights
monitoring of content quality
monitoring of copyright infringements
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adjustment

- re-definition and re-negotiation of the contract
Table 1: Transaction cost components in content syndication

According to WILLIAMSON, “Exchanges that are supported by transaction specific investments are
neither faceless nor instantaneous” [Williamson, 1984: 202]. This statement does not longer hold for
content syndication, since it becomes possible that transactions are conducted by intelligent
technology, automatically negotiating contracts and instantaneously creating transaction specific
“investments” like DTDs and exchange protocols. This again emphasises the changes in content
transactions due to the emerging digital technology and reinforces the importance of a specific
transaction cost analysis for the subject on hand.

3.

OUTSOURCING OF THE CONTENT PRODUCTION

In order to design a socio-economic relationship in an economically reasonable way, the influencing
parameters (i.e. sources) of transaction costs are to be assessed and the advantageous organisational
arrangement is to be chosen [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 182]. Folowing this procedure, we want to analyse
transaction cost sources in content syndication and discuss how the transaction process can be
designed in order to handle transaction costs effectively.
3.1.

Analysis of the transaction cost sources

Bounded rationality
Content syndication on the basis of digital networks does both mitigate and increase bounded
rationality. It mitigates bounded rationality due to an electronically supported reduction in search costs
and the possibility to offer product samples of digital information products at close to zero cost.
Bounded rationality is increased due to a wider availability of transaction opportunities since the
electronic market is not spatially limited and information goods are generally difficult to be valued
(since cost based valuation is infeasible [Shapiro/Varian, 1998]). Neither does the originator know
about the commercial potential of its products for the publisher, nor does the publisher know about the
production cost and re-usability of the product – this complicates product valuation.
Decisive for bounded rationality in content transactions is the information paradox. Acquiring
externally produced information involves the inability of evaluation prior to consumption, impeding
the buyer to rationally decide between different offerings. In the case of content syndication, where the
buyer does not consume but commercialise the product, content can well be assessed prior to the resale, i.e. prior to the transfer of property rights from the originator to the buyer. However, the buyer
faces various offerings and cannot fully assess all information products available, especially in
recurring delivery (e.g. several news stories a day), and confronts information overload. Further the
commercial potential of certain information products is rather vaguely to be determined from the
subscriber’s point of view (adverse selection issue).
Opportunism
Content syndication offers various options for opportunism for both the originator and the subscriber
of content – particularly when their contact is based to a large extent on the internet and exhibits a high
level of anonymity. The originator can take advantage of the subscriber’s experience problem by
delivering poor quality content or he can deliver content in a way differing from the agreed upon
delivery scheme, e.g. not in time or not in the right data format (moral hazard issue). Both, originator
and subscriber can cheat on copyright agreements by re-selling exclusively delivered content to third
parties. The subscriber can modify content what he might not be allowed to (i.e. he does not possess
the property right of alteration). Generally, these courses of action, especially the disobeying to
copyright agreements, are difficult to monitor (i.e. only at high costs) for the other party. This gives
rise to opportunism in content syndication.
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Asset specificity
Asset specificity describes the extent to which parties are locked into a transaction relationship and
splits into four categories [Williamson, 1981: 555; Joskow, 1991: 126]. We will discuss these
categories separately in respect of the specific product and transaction process on hand.
Site specificity occurs if transaction-related investments are specifically bound to a certain location.
In the internet it is – at first view – only negligibly relevant where transaction partners are located
since distance becomes less important and content can globally be transferred in seconds. However,
site specificity occurs if the legal framework (i.e. copyright law) is taken into consideration, which
often varies significantly among countries and which is highly important for the distribution of
content.
Physical asset specificity describes specific investments in real assets (e.g. machines) which are
specifically necessary for the transaction. Digital information products are stored and transferred using
standard technology (computer hardware) and – besides specifically designed programs – also
standard software (e.g. standard internet protocols like TCP/IP or databases). These assets are
constantly becoming less expensive and can easily be utilised for other purposes. Thus, physical asset
specificity is not relevant for content syndication.
Human asset specificity is highly relevant for both the production of content and the execution of
the transaction. Content as an intellectual product needs specific human abilities for production (and
classification) and the transaction is based on complicated contracts designed by human experts.
Human investments in personal relationships and knowledge about the transaction partner (i.e.
knowledge on information needs and offerings) are also important. However, contract-related human
asset specificity will become less relevant in the long run as standardised skeleton contracts are
developed and agent based automatic contract negotiation becomes viable. Also for supporting tasks
(content classification, selection and transfer) human asset specificity is decreasingly relevant due to
advancing technology.
Dedicated assets are developed or acquired in order to conduct transactions with a particular
partner or group of partners. Investments in dedicated assets would not be made if there was no
prospect of exchanging a significant amount of a product. In the field of content syndication, these are
specific technical frameworks for the standardised exchange of content (e.g. document type definitions
(DTDs) for XML, or specific protocols like ICE or NITF) which are specifically used for content
transactions. While ICE and NITF provide standardised protocols and don’t vary among the partners
using them, DTDs describe a specific data format and can be idiosyncratic for the content exchange
among two partners. We conclude that dedicated assets are highly relevant for content transactions if
long term relations are considered.
Table 2 summarises the findings for asset specificity and assesses asset specificity for content
syndication.
Site specificity

Physical asset specificity

Human asset specificity

Dedicated assets

location not relevant for content transfer
but: relevant in respect of international copyright law
Æ moderately relevant for content transactions
necessary hard- and software increasingly inexpensive
standard technology can be used for other purposes
Æ marginally relevant for content transactions
intellectual capital needed for content production/classification and
contract design
standard skeleton contracts need less human involvement
Æ marginally relevant for content transactions in the long run
specific exchange protocols and document type definitions
Æ highly relevant for content transactions
Table 2: Assessment of asset specificity
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Asset specificity is usually considered to have the most influence on the issue of which organisational
arrangement (market or hierarchy) is most efficient [Williamson, 1991: 284]. Thus, as the importance
of asset specificity decreases, not only due to internet technology but due to the specificities of the
product itself, we expect a move to the market for digital information products.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is connected with and primarily results from opportunism and bounded rationality. It can
be distinguished between a primary (or strategic) and a secondary (non-strategic) kind of uncertainty
[Williamson, 1984: 62]. Primary uncertainty occurs because of misleading and disguising behaviour of
the interactors (behavioural uncertainty), secondary uncertainty results from a lack of communication
[Koopmans, 1957: 147] and unpredictable environmental conditions.
While the second kind of uncertainty is likely to decrease in pure electronic markets (due to extended
possibilities for communication and a higher information intensity of the transaction), the first kind is
rather increasing, since now parties are able to become trading partners whose internet-based contacts
have a higher level of anonymity - giving rise to opportunism. Further, using the extended means of
communication can easily be avoided by parties of the transaction (or abused for false information),
thus increasing the level of uncertainty for the other party. On the other hand, quality uncertainty,
resulting from the product-inherent experience problem, can be mitigated through easily available
product samples.
Frequency
“The cost of specialised governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a
recurring kind” [Williamson, 1984: 206]. Transaction frequency influences the possibility to
economize on transaction- as well as production cost due to economies of scale and scope.
WILLIAMSON’s statement implies that low transaction frequency favours market organisation while
high frequency offers economies of scale in hierarchical production. However, due to the specific cost
structure of digital information goods, this conclusion has to be reassessed. High frequency of
transactions allows economies of scale in both hierarchical and market organisations and generally
reduces transaction costs. Since no clear statement is possible on whether high frequency favours
market or hierarchy, frequency of transaction plays no decisive role [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 180].
Table 3 summarises the findings and assesses the relevance of each transaction cost source for the
outsourcing decision.
transaction
cost source
bounded
rationality
opportunism
asset
specificity
uncertainty
frequency

specificities in content syndication
-

relevance for the
outsourcing decision

valuation difficulties for experience goods
information overload due to proliferative content offerings
commercial potential of information products unclear for subscriber
delivery of poor quality or not-agreed formats in a not-agreed upon scheme
disobeying to copyrights
use of standard technology and standard protocols
decreasing relevance of human asset specificity in the long term
results from high bounded rationality and opportunities for opportunism
also: high level of anonymity on electronic markets
no clear statement if high frequency still necessitates hierarchical organisation
generally: less relevance of frequency due to less relevance of asset specificity

++
++
0
++
0

Table 3: Assessment of transaction cost sources in content syndication

3.2.

Designing the content transaction

We have found that three sources of transaction costs are particularly relevant for online content
syndication – bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty. Bearing in mind that content
syndication involves massive economies of scale in the content production and is – considering
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production costs – regularly preferable against in-house production, we want to analyse in a further
step, which types of digital content are suited for content syndication (i.e. involve low bounded
rationality, opportunism and uncertainty) and which options transaction partners have in designing the
transaction process in order to reduce the sources of transaction costs.
Properties and relevant attributes of digital information goods
In contrast to physical goods, (particularly digital) information goods are costly to produce but cheaply
to reproduce, i.e. they exhibit high first-copy-costs [Shapiro/Varian, 1998: 3]. Digital information
goods can easily be copied without loss in quality, easily altered (customised) and transported through
digital networks. Thus, markets for digital information goods don’t exhibit scarcity, information goods
are never consumed. Due to missing technical restrictions in copying, the enforcement of copyrights is
more difficult in comparison to markets for offline media (e.g. the book market). Thus, in analysing
the market for digital information goods, the consideration of copyrights is essential. Further,
information goods are experience goods, their quality cannot be assessed prior to consumption. This
“information paradox” causes problems for the ex-ante valuation of information goods.
In addition to these general properties, digital information goods have various attributes which are
economically important and can affect bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty in the
transaction. BALLOU ET AL. mention timeliness, data quality, cost, and value [Ballou et al., 1994] of
which we consider most important the speed of devaluation (timeliness) and value (which includes
data quality). Additionally relevant is the size of the target group as it is significant for the content
value. Other attributes like data volume and media richness influence transaction costs too, but are not
correlated with bounded rationality, opportunism or uncertainty. Speed of devaluation is positively
correlated with bounded rationality and uncertainty, since higher speed leaves less time for gathering
information on the product. Short time leaves less space for opportunism which becomes less relevant
with high speed of devaluation. In contrast, high value of information goods increases the incentives
for opportunism but has negligible effect on bounded rationality. A side-effect of high value goods
being connected with brand names is a reduction in secondary uncertainty. As the size of the target
group is one factor determining the value of a good, large size has a rising effect on opportunism, but
reduces bounded rationality and uncertainty due to wider availability of information on the target
group and the profit potential of the information good. Since most attributes of information goods
affect transaction costs in both directions, we cannot give a general statement on which goods are
suited best for content syndication. By tendency – if we consider opportunism as a factor with minor
impact (i.e. if it can easily be covered by contracts or the relationship is based on trust), high value
information goods for a broad target group, which are slowly devaluating, are better suited for
outsourcing than low value, rapidly devaluating goods for a small target group. Considering
opportunism a major factor, the correlation is vice versa.
Opportunities for transaction partners
Independently from the type of content exchanged, transaction partners have options to influence the
levels of bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty by either modifying product attributes or
the transaction process. Transaction partners have technical, economical and legal opportunities to
exert influence.
Bounded rationality
Economically, the experience problem can be mitigated by providing product samples or signalling
product quality (e.g. through brand names). In order to reduce information overload, intelligent
information systems for search- and classification can be employed which reduce search costs.
Opportunism
Technically, content can be modified to prevent or track unauthorized copying or to reduce the value
of a copied version. Further, using technical standards can limit the freedom of both partners to modify
technical agreements. Economically, the speed of devaluation can be increased by providing new
versions of the product in shorter duration. Another way of creating economic incentives against
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opportunism could be revenue sharing between originator and publisher. Legal opportunities arise
from copyright law and are bound to the extent to which property rights are transferred. Transaction
partners can reduce opportunism by contractually defining detailed property rights for both partners.
Transaction costs are reduced if standardised contract templates are used.
Uncertainty
Strategic uncertainty, resulting from misleading behaviour of the transaction partners, can be reduced
as described for opportunism. Non-strategic uncertainty decreases as contract duration increases, thus
transaction partners should aim at long-term contracts.

4.

INTERMEDIATION IN ONLINE CONTENT SYNDICATION

Online content syndication between two parties can cause considerable transaction costs – especially
during the initial phases of a transaction (particularly search costs). As the employment of
intermediaries potentially reduces market transaction costs, we will focus in the following on the
impact of intermediation on online content syndication.
4.1.

Intermediary impact on the transaction costs sources

We want to assess the impact of intermediaries on bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty as
well as on possible new sources of transaction costs which might arise from intermediation. „An
intermediary, also called a middleman or broker in the research literature in various fields, helps to
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by providing value-added services such as
aggregation and distribution of products and product information, quality checks and warranties“
[Chircu/Kauffman, 2000]. BAILEY mentions aggregation, pricing, search and trust as roles of
intermediaries [Bailey, 1998: 33]. Merchant intermediaries (for a distinction of merchant and broker
intermediaries see [Rose, 1999: 67]) cover a set of trade functions: quantity function, assortment
function, advertising- and consulting function as well as spatial, temporal and financial demand
adaptation function [Gümbel, 1985: 168; Müller-Hagedorn, 1998: 108]. In respect of information
goods, the quantity function and the spatial demand adaptation function are less relevant since
electronic reproduction- and transportation capacities are almost costless.
Bounded rationality
Based on the advertising function of the intermediary, bounded rationality in online content
syndication can be significantly decreased due to a reduction in the number of contacts, hence, a
reduction in search costs, resulting from the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, exemplary depicted in Figure 3
[Gümbel, 1985: 110], and due to assessment of product quality by the intermediary [Becker, 2001:
11]. It is assumed, that only one intermediary exists and transaction partners do not confront search
costs to find the intermediary.
direct contact

intermediation

P

P

O

P

O

O

P

O

O

P

O

I

P

15 contacts

P

O

Originator

P

P

Publisher

P

I

Intermediary

P

8 contacts

Figure 3 : Reduction in search costs through intermediation (Baligh-Richartz-Effect)

In addition to search costs, also contracting costs are reduced, since each transaction partner only has
to enter one contract with the intermediary even if content is exchanged with more that one party. The

559
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland

— First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —

Markus Anding, Thomas Hess

intermediary represents a single point of contact for originators and publishers whose cognitive
disability to perceive and valuate all available information products is reduced due to a pre-valuation
and categorisation by the intermediary (assortment function). The independent pre-valuation (pricing)
of information products, based on the intermediary’s experience and market knowledge, notably
reduces bounded rationality (consulting function).
Opportunism
Opportunism can be reduced through the intermediary’s assortment function, providing a pre-selection
of originators and publishers which reduces the risk of adverse selection. Intermediaries can act as
trusted third parties (trust role), supervising the transaction and defining a framework for the design of
contracts (consulting function). Besides standardised contract design, intermediaries can provide a
technical platform for the content exchange, leaving few space for copyright infringements.
Uncertainty
Primary uncertainty is reduced by the intermediary as it is described for bounded rationality and
opportunism. Secondary uncertainty is mitigated by the demand adaptation functions of the
intermediary. The uncertainties in supply and demand of single originators and publishers are
alleviated – the intermediary can provide a steady level of content offerings and content demand and
even out inequalities. Financial uncertainty can be reduced through financial demand adaptation,
aligning the required payment schemes of originators and publishers. The intermediary can reduce
financial uncertainty by taking contingency risk.
bounded rationality
assortment
advertising and consulting
demand adaptation

p
p
o

opportunism
o
p
o

uncertainty
p
p
p

Table 4: Impact of intermediary functions on relevant transaction cost sources (p=reduces, n=increases, o=no impact).

Other transaction cost sources
Besides bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty, intermediaries can also influence asset
specificity and frequency. Asset specificity can be further reduced by standardisation efforts of the
intermediary and a reduction in necessary specific investments of originators and publishers
(standardisation of data formats can take place at the intermediary, originators and publishers can keep
proprietary formats). The heterogeneity of product-representation is reduced. Intermediaries match
differing demands for frequency of originators and subscribers (demand adaptation function). The
frequency of transactions performed by the intermediary exceeds the frequency of transactions a single
transaction partner performs without the intermediary, thus, the intermediary can better realise
economies of scale.
Since the intermediary institution is prone to bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty,
intermediation might also rise transaction costs. Bounded rationality results from the intermediary’s
inability to know all possible transaction partners and their content offerings and demands, as well as
limitations in perfectly matching them. Further, a specialised intermediary has an information
advantage over originators and publishers which he can exploit opportunistically. Uncertainty results
from imperfect knowledge about the future content offerings and demands on the market as well as
from the intermediary’s uncertainty about the behaviour of transaction partners.
In contrast with the reductions in transaction costs due to intermediation, which directly result from
the intermediation function and are not directly influenced by actions of the intermediary, the
increasing transaction costs due to bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty can directly be
affected by the intermediary’s actions.
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4.2.

Assessment of intermediation in online content syndication

We have found that the intermediary institution reduces as well as increases certain sources of
transaction costs. In order to organise the content syndication transaction per intermediation in an
optimal way, we have to compare cost and utility of employing an intermediary institution.
As the intermediary itself can be considered a specific asset for the transaction process, all costs
occurring at the intermediary level are asset specific costs for originators and publishers. We have to
compare these asset specific costs with benefits in bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty
(as well as the less relevant asset specificity and frequency).
Reductions in bounded rationality and uncertainty due to intermediation are substantial (see Table 4)
and will most probably not be outweighed by accruing bounded rationality and uncertainty of the
intermediary. In contrast to that, the reduction in opportunism due to the advertising and consulting
(particularly contracting) function of the intermediary must be considered moderately in comparison
with additional opportunism of the intermediary institution. This additional opportunism could easily
prevail. Hence, the focus should be set to opportunism as the source of transaction costs which could
increase due to intermediation in online content syndication.
Transaction partners will employ an intermediary if reductions in bounded rationality and uncertainty
outweigh possible higher opportunism, i.e. if overall transaction cost sources are reduced (assuming
that the different sources equally result in transaction costs) and this overall reduction compensates the
intermediary’s service charges. In reality, content intermediaries charged up to 70% of the sales price
which probably was a reason for the failure of many. Enforcing a reduction of the intermediary’s
opportunism – either technically, economically or legally – is crucial in designing the content
syndication transaction via an intermediary. Thus, transaction partners have to carefully design the
technical infrastructure, the economic incentives for the intermediary (i.e. the percentage of
commission) and the legal framework of the transaction. Intermediaries can proactively take the
position of “trusted third parties” [Schoop/List, 2001] in order to signal low opportunism.

5.

CONCLUSION

The paper on hand analysed the sources of transaction costs in the specific field of online content
syndication. The first important finding is, that not all five sources of transaction costs are equally
relevant in this specific field, but bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty play the most
significant role. Asset specificity, generally the most influential factor in transaction cost economics, is
less important in online content syndication. Further analysis revealed quality and speed of
devaluation as parameters of information products that affect transaction cost sources as well as
technical, economical and legal opportunities of transaction partners to reduce of these sources. The
subsequent analysis of intermediary impact on transaction cost sources showed that intermediaries
reduce bounded rationality and uncertainty but might increase opportunism in online content
syndication. The above analysis of which kind of information goods are appropriate for content
syndication indicates that using intermediaries, rather low value, rapidly devaluating information
goods for a small target group are suitable – as long as opportunism is a factor with major relevance.
The focus on employing intermediaries should thus be set on reducing opportunism in order to
broaden the scope for trade in information goods. Further research in this field should involve property
rights- and principal agent theory.
However, some methodological limitations of the analysis are to be considered. The method of
research can only provide tendency statements, since transaction costs cannot be quantified precisely.
Transaction costs are not to be taken as the sole basis for an outsourcing decision if production costs
vary among different organisational arrangements (discussed by [Williamson, 1984: 212]). This is
particularly relevant for online content syndication since internal and external production costs (i.e.
first- and second copy costs) vary significantly, making outsourcing profitable even if external
561
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland

— First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —

Markus Anding, Thomas Hess

transaction costs are high. Besides transaction- and production costs, other effects influence the
outsourcing decision. Content originators are often reluctant to provide high quality content digitally
and publishers have difficulties in judging the economic value of externally acquired content. The last
point is interrelated with a lack of available research on the utility-function of the content consumer.
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